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Imagery and Expectations for
International Disaster Response
Nathan E. Clark*
ABSTRACT

This Article examines the development and contributions of
the Charter on Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated Use of
Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or Technological
Disasters (Charter). As a voluntary mechanism among
spacefaring nations and transnational entities, the Charter
provides remote sensing data and information for international
disasterresponse efforts. Over the past fifteen years, the Charter
members have continued to contribute and cooperate in an
effective manner, in spite of increasing legislative and economic
controls over the access and distribution of data at the State
level. This Article finds that the behaviors of Charter members
largely fall outside of traditional, geopolitical rationales over
security and commercial interests, and argues that the guiding
dynamics of the Charter stem from a historical construct of
actions and ideals from actors within scientific and technical
communities. Drawing from normative concepts within
international relations theory, the Article concludes that the
Charter has become a progressive case for the potential
influence of non-binding legal frameworks on interstate
cooperation.
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Remote sensing activities shall be carriedout for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic, social or
scientific and technological development, and
taking into particularconsiderationthe needs of
the developing countries. - PrincipleII
Remote sensing shall promote the protection of
mankind from natural disasters. - PrincipleXI

I. INTRODUCTION

By now, the benefits of satellite remote sensing' for disaster
management are well known within global relief networks. Among
other things, remote sensing data and information are used to direct
aid, monitor flooding, and make detailed damage assessments. In the
immediate aftermath of a major disaster, the sharing of these data
across borders is crucial. However, disjointed policy objectives and the
increase of regulatory measures at the state level can obstruct the
open exchange of data among global stakeholders. To overcome these
obstacles, the Charteron Cooperationto Achieve the Coordinated Use
2
of Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or Technological Disaster
has emerged as an international effort, which brings together public
and private actors from relevant sectors to provide rapid and effective
technical assistance to any state or community immediately affected
by large-scale disasters. The Charter's members operate on a
voluntary basis and have consistently pooled the necessary space
resources together to respond to some 450 plus incidents in over 110
countries.3 Through a growing network of national space agencies,
private entities, and cooperating bodies, the Charter is steadily
becoming a compelling model for addressing global issues through
cross-sectoral cooperation.
One of the Charter's greatest achievements has been the ability
to navigate many of the political barriers that stifle international aid
and remote sensing activities alike. To date, the signatories to the

1.
In the broadest sense, satellite remote sensing refers to the acquisition of
satellite-derived imagery through passive (optical) or active (radar) sensing techniques.
Furthermore, unless specified, this paper focuses on non-military, high or very-high
resolution remote sensing activities.
2.
Charter on Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated Use of Space Facilities
in the Event of Natural or Technological Disaster, Apr. 25, 2000 [hereinafter Charter
Text], https://www.disasterscharter.org/web/guest/home
[http://perma.cc/PNJ8-3Z2X]
(archived Sept. 3, 2015).
3.
Activations, INT'L CHARTER SPACE & MAJOR DISASTERS (2015) [hereinafter
Charter Activations], https://www.disasterscharter.org/web/guest/activations [http://
perma.cc/A47K-R7BT] (archived Sept. 3, 2015).
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Charter include state agencies from nearly every major geopolitical
powerhouse. 4 Their ability to effectively cooperate and willingness to
contribute on a non-discriminatory basis is as commendable as it is
puzzling, particularly when considering the inherent security
implications and commercial interests that accompany remote
sensing technologies. This Article, then, attempts to provide a
possible explanation for these behaviors. It views the overall
activities of the Charter outside of the geostrategic interests of states,
and asks the question: why do states sanction these efforts?
To begin, this Article will provide a general overview of the field.
It will argue that historically, many of the policy trends surrounding
both space and aid initiatives within Charter member states appear
to clash with these states' ongoing and implicit backing of Charter
activities. This would suggest that the developments leading up to the
Charter have been driven instead by a number of individuals from
the scientific and technical communities, which interact within what
John Ruggie identifies as the global public domain.5 Here, the
rationalinterests and subsequent behaviors of the member states are
not predefined; rather, they are shaped and reshaped through
dialogues, ideas, beliefs, and expectations among state and non-state
actors, within and across borders. Building from normative
approaches in constructivism, this Article will argue that over time,
the expertise and beliefs of these actors have helped shape a number
of international and domestic legal principles and policies, which, in
turn, have aided in the establishment of the Charter. Lastly, this
Article will discuss the influence of these social and legal normative
processes on the efforts and achievements of the Charter, and will
offer some reflection on the future role of non-binding legal norms.

II. THE POLICY FIELD

4.
Charter Members, INT'L CHARTER SPACE & MAJOR DISASTERS (2015)
[hereinafter Charter Members], https://www.disasterscharter.org/web/guest/chartermembers [https://perma.cc/XMW5-HQE3] (archived Sept. 21, 2015). It should be
pointed out that nation-states are not direct parties to the Charter. However, this
article uses the term Charter state(s) as the contributions by Charter members are
ultimately state-sanctioned activities. Under public international law (and
subsequently the domestic legal frameworks of all satellite operating nations), the
rights and obligations of both state and non-state actors, in terms of their ability to
acquire and distribute data nationally and across borders, fall within the legal (and
political) authority of the state. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activites of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, art. VI, Dec. 19, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
Outer Space Treaty]. Moreover, while both state and non-state actors participate in the
Charter, the signatory parties (primarily satellite operators and data providers) are
state entities. Charter Members, supra.
5.
John Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain-Issues, Actors, and
Practices,10 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 499, 507 (2004).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

988

[VOL. 48:985

In order to understand what dynamics presently guide the actors
in this field, this Part divides the policy developments leading up to
the phenomena of international, space-derived disaster assistance
into two parts. The first will provide a brief overview of the strategic
interests of spacefaring nations over the last half century, and the
second will draw attention to another set of actors, which emerged in
the same period, and whose interests and actions generally escape
the rational assumptions within domestic and international politics.
The road to establishing an International Charter on Space and
Major Disasters has been long and rutted with competing interests
within and among states. From as early as the Space Race between
the United States and the former Soviet Union, concerns over
national
security,
geopolitical
mobility,
and
commercial
competitiveness have continued to influence international cooperative
efforts for the development and use of space resources. This is
particularly true for satellite earth observation technologies
originally developed for reconnaissance and weather monitoring
purposes. 6 Remote sensing has long since been the double-edged
sword of spacefaring nations; the need to monitor the natural
environment has been juxtaposed with the state's ability to monitor
its neighbors. This duality, along with the commercialization of the
industry, has ensured that national policy objectives remain divided. 7
At present, the operational and political settings for remote
sensing activities vary to some degree across borders. However, most
states have embraced public-private partnership (PPP) models, which
buttress
global
market
domestic
needs
and
facilitate
competitiveness. 8 Advances in technology and new actors in the field
have also resulted in domestic regulatory trends prioritizing security
concerns and profit maximization over civil services such as
environmental monitoring. Within nearly every remote sensing
capable state, these interests translate into rigid licensing and
monetary controls.9 In the global disaster context, data policies and
intellectual property laws detailing who can access data and for what
purposes increasingly insulate these data at the national level.

6.

See, e.g., Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of Satellite Remote Sensing, in

HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 501, 506 (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Tronchetti, Legal Aspects].

7.
See id. at 526-43. See generally Working Grp. on Nat'l Legislation Relevant
to the Peaceful Expl. & Use of Outer Space, Schematic Overview of Nat'l Regulatory
Frameworks for Space Activities, U.N. Doc. AIAC.105/C.2/2014/CRP.5 (2014); JOANNE
GABRYNOWICZ,

THE

LAND

REMOTE

SENSING

LAwS AND

POLICIES

OF NATIONAL

GOVERNMENTS: A GLOBAL SURVEY (2007).
See generally GABRYNOWICZ, supra note 7 (explaining that the concepts
8.
commerical and private differ nationally and that the type of PPP arrangments can
vary considerably from state to state); Tronchetti, supra note 6, at 526-43.
9.
See generally GABRYNOWICZ, supra note 7. This point is particularly true
for high-resolution data. Medium and low-resolution data are regulated less rigidly.
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Moreover, the economic value of high-resolution data reduces the
incentives for charitable or lower-cost contributions by public and
private satellite operators and data distributors. In the case of the
Charter, for example, data contributions from commercial operators
have little or nothing to do with corporate philanthropy. Rather,
these entities receive government subsidies and, through various
contractual arrangements, agree (or in some cases are obligated) to
provide data.1 0 Ultimately, the question has become why give data
when you can sell it, especially if it means selling the data back to the
state. It is a win-win scenario, but one that does not explain why
states would earmark these resources for international disaster relief
in the first place.
However, these developments have been accompanied by a third
policy area in remote sensing, which emerged from early
environmental monitoring projects and worked to promote broader
civil-based objectives. Within the United States and the former Soviet
space programs, the ability to observe changes in the weather and
environment from space was a major catalyst for advancing satellite
technologies. Almost immediately, the management of these
applications became a battle of interests. For instance, following the
establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) in 1958, the scientific and technical staff found themselves
lobbying against the Department of Defense (DOD) for control over
the design and use of space resources for scientific exploration and
civil services.'1 But remote sensing was first and foremost a technical
activity, which gave the scientists and engineers designing and
operating the systems significant authority over how and what the
technology should be used for. These efforts helped set a new global
precedent for space agencies, and eventually led to national land
monitoring programs such as Landsat (1972) in the United States,
SPOT (1986) in France, and the IRS-IA (1988) in India.12 Although
commercial interests would play some part in each of these programs
over time,' 3 a deeper normative understanding had emerged,
providing that these assets should be used for scientific exploration
and for the protection of the environment and humankind. Today,

10.
See, e.g., National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Commercial Archive
Oct.
9,
2014),
http://cad4nasa.gsfc.nasa.gov
Data, NASA
(last
updated
[http://perma.cc/H65T-YCV3] (archived Sept. 4, 2015) (detailing the NextView
contractual arrangement between DigitalGlobe and the U.S. government).
11.
PAMELA E. MACK, VIEWING THE EARTH: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE
LANDSAT SATELLITE SYSTEM 11 (1990).

12.
ATsuYo ITO, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING 10-11 (2011).
13.
For example, the Landsat commercial history. See Joanne Gabrynowicz,
American Perspectives on the Use of Geospatial Data: Landsat and Beyond (Aug. 8,
2015), at 18, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/Presentations_2015/
[http://perma.ce/6Y4F-9L4P]
17june_- 2015/2015_GabrynowiczGeospatialESPI.pdf
(archived Sept. 3, 2015).
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these programs and others like them primarily function to provide
open access to tasked and archived data from lower resolution
satellites for scientific, academic, and recreational purposes.
Early on, the scientific and technical communities within the
space sector also recognized the benefits of sharing knowledge and
resources across borders. Throughout the Cold War era, actors within
the United States and Soviet space programs worked together to
establish bilateral and multilateral partnerships.1 4 While some
efforts, such as Apollo-Soyuz, were meant to ease political tensions,
other projects were driven by more pragmatic, ideational motives. A
good example is COSPAS-SARSAT, an international search and
rescue program established by Canada, France, the Soviet Union, and
the United States in 1979.15 The system is still in service today, and
uses satellite-aided tracking to locate airplanes or ships in distress.
In a similar vein, a number of transnational partnerships and
organizations have emerged in recent years to share resources and
expertise, and promote the use of satellite-derived information for
disaster management purposes. The Group on Earth Observation
(GEO), for instance, is working to establish a set of global datasharing principles to facilitate the open exchange of data among
relevant entities. 16 On the operational side, the Committee on Earth
Observation Satellites (CEOS) is coordinating a Recovery
Observatory where remote sensing data and information will be
collected and used in a systematic manner for long-term, postdisaster recovery objectives. l
Interestingly, outside of the space sector, identical groups of
scientific and technical experts have been promoting international
disaster aid initiatives from as early as the International Geophysical
Year.' 8 Proponents for a global alliance for addressing natural
disasters began to spill over from emerging humanitarian initiatives
comprised of NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), various UN bodies, and actors from the scientific, technical,

14.

See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-ISS-618, U.S.-RusSIAN

COOPERATION IN SPACE 12 (1995).

&

15.
Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking, NAT'L OCEANIC
ADMIN.
[NOAA],
http://www.sarsat.noaa.gov/background.html
ATMOSPHERIC
[http://perma.cc/W63X-ENUZ] (archived Sept. 3, 2015).
16.
GEO Data Sharing Principles Implementation, GRP. ON EARTH
[http://
OBSERVATIONS
[GEO], https://www.earthobservations.org/geoss-dsp.shtml
perma.cc/FE2U-8E37 (archived Sept. 3, 2015).
17.

Recovery Observatory, COMM. ON EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITES [CEOS],

http://ceos.org/ourwork/workinggroups/disasters/pilots/
(archived Sept. 3, 2015).

[http://perma.cc/9E5Q-V565]

See JOHN HANNIGAN, DISASTERS WITHOUT BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONAL
18.
POLITICS OF NATURAL DISASTERS 60-61 (2012). Note that the IGY took place between

July 1957 and December 1958.
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and academic communities. 19 In particular, growing research
networks of geologists, meteorologists, and engineers worked to
institutionalize scientific and technological cooperation into efforts
such as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the
20
International Decade for Natural Hazard Reduction (IDNHR). John

Hannigan cites Paul Edwards (2006)

and Clark Miller (2001),

asserting that through these mechanisms, the scientific and technical
community signaled the need for international collaboration, and
solidified their future role in the shaping of global disaster policy.21
Over time, two broad categories of actors have emerged to
influence the policy areas around global, space-based disaster
assistance. This Article divides their motives and actions into two
22
Group one stems
groups: rational interests and normative values.
from rational choice assumptions, which regard the formation and
functioning of international institutions such as the Charter as
instrumental processes directed by states in pursuit of absolute or
relative gains. 23 Whereas group two builds from constructivism which
rejects the notion of the state as a self-standing, utility-maximizing
organ, and sees state preferences being shaped by multiple actors
with diverse interests and beliefs. 24 As discussed throughout the
previous Part, both groups represent state and non-state actors
whose roles need to be considered in the development of this field.
However, this Article is particularly interested in the impact of the
non-traditional state actors pursuing normative agendas. These
actors are value-driven in the sense that they are motivated and/or
guided by common social ideals that often fall outside geostrategic

19.

Id. at 50-51, 61, 76.

Id. at 61; WMO in Brief, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG. [WMO],
https://www.wmo.int/pages/about/indexen.html [http://perma.cc/5X95-7587] (archived
Sept. 4, 2015) (noting that from its founding in 1873 until 1950, the WMO was known
as the International Meteorological Association); U.N. Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction,
Disaster
for
Strategy
International
[UNISDR],
Reduction
http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/international-strategy-for-disaster-reduction
[http://perma.cc/3JMD-RPFH] (archived Sept. 3, 2015).
HANNIGAN, supra note 18, at 61.
21.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Law, Legalization and Politics: An
22.
Agenda for the Next Generation of IL/IR Scholars, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
20.

PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF

THE ART 33, 41-44 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark Pollack eds., 2013).
For a summary of these positions as they relate to international law, see
23.
Ian Johnston, Law-Making by International Organizations: Perspectives from IL/IR
&

PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
Theory, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 266, 266-92 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff

Mark Pollack eds., 2013); Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J. Troope, Constructivism and
&

InternationalLaw, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 119, 119-45 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff

Mark Pollack eds., 2013).
24.
Id.
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and economic rationales. 25 States begin to adopt these new norms not
because they are obligated, but as a response to socialization
processes and peer pressures, which prescribe expected or
appropriate behaviors. 26 Furthermore, to strengthen and advance
their agendas, normative actors often institutionalize and codify their
beliefs into laws, rules, and organizations at the international level.27
Within the space sector, these actors have a long record of using
international social and legal forums to promote cooperation and the
use of remote sensing as a public good. Thus, in the following Part,
this Article explores how these beliefs emerged in a legal context and,
subsequently, became guiding principles for remote sensing activities
at international and domestic levels.

III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS

Within the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (UNCOPOUS), a number of treaties and General
Assembly resolutions containing principles and declarations have
been adopted over the past fifty years to provide what is now
regarded as the fundamental body of international space law. 28 From
these instruments, remote sensing activities are specifically
addressed within the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the
Earth from Outer Space (Principles), and indirectly through the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).2 9 Neither instrument imposes
binding obligations specifically referencing remote sensing activities.
However, the provisions in these documents reflect the consensus
among rational and normative actors within and among states at the
time of drafting and have had a significant impact on policies and
practices relating to remote sensing over the last few decades. For
these reasons, this Article will discuss the development and authority
of each instrument in turn.

25.
Abbott & Sindal, supra note 22, at 41-44.
26.
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 895 (1998).
27.
Id. at 900.
28.
Note this paper does not cover bilateral, multilateral or regional legal
agreements, as these instruments do not apply to the Charter.
29.
See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4; G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles
Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter
Remote Sensing Principles]. Remote sensing activities also fall under the 1972 Liability
Convention and the 1975 Registration Convention. However, these instruments are
outside the scope of this Article.
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A. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967
and provided the overarching framework for the legal rights and
obligations of states engaged in the use and exploration of outer
space. Leading up to the Treaty, growing concerns over the potential
appropriation and weaponization of space had spurred the adoption of
early draft resolutions by the General Assembly, which put forth the
proposition that the use and exploration of outer space should be free
and peaceful endeavors-sentiments that would eventually become
the normative foundations of legal matters surrounding space
activities. 30 In its final form, the Treaty did not address specific
technical applications or stipulate enforcement procedures in detail, 31
but it did provide binding provisions which reflect many of the ideals
that were later integrated and expanded upon within the Remote
Sensing Principles, and, subsequently, the text and practices of the
Charter. These include Article I, which guarantees the free use of
outer space for the benefits and interest of all nations; as well as
Articles I, III, IX, X, and XI on the promotion of international
cooperation; Article XI on the importance of information sharing; and
Article VI which provides that contracting states are internationally
responsible for the national space activities of "government agencies
and non-government entities." 32
By the mid-1970s, an increase in remote sensing capable states
and a prospective commercial market looming on the horizon saw the
need for a more coherent international agreement for sensing
activities. Negotiations among groups of state actors from western
nations, the Soviet bloc, and lesser-developed countries (LDCs) were
held within a working group of the UNCOPOUS Legal
Subcommittee.3 3 Within each delegation, a range of domestic
interests were represented. For example, the U.S. contingent
included a legal advisor from the Department of State and
representatives from DOD, the Federal Communications Commission

30.
G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1963); G.A.
Res. 1721 (XVI), International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Dec.
20, 1961); Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space
Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COMMERCE 419, 425 (1967).
31.
Note that the Outer Space Treaty is part of public international law.
Therefore whatever is applicable regarding enforcement at international law also
applies to the Treaty. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. III.
32.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I, III, IX, X, XI, VI.
33.
See Carol L. Butler & Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Interview: S. Neil
Hosenball, in THE UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES RELATING TO REMOTE SENSING OF THE
EARTH FROM SPACE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-INTERVIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE

UNITED STATES DELEGATION 7-8 (Joanne Gabrynowicz
Hosenball Interview].

ed.,

2002) [hereinafter

994
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(FCC), and NASA. 34 However, in spite of the differences that may
have existed among these actors, the drafting of the Principles largely
revolved around one central issue: should states have prior consent to
sense and distribute data relating to territories other than their
own?35 For commercial and scientific (and potentially security)
purposes, such provisions would only hamper the progress of sensing
states and, in fact, went against core principles stipulated in the
Outer Space Treaty. Still, the LDCs wanted assurance that their
sovereignty would not be violated, and argued that they should be
afforded the same benefits as sensing States, as guaranteed by
Article I of the Treaty. The compromise between these two positions
would be found in the context of disasters.
B. The Remote Sensing Principles
On December 3, 1986, the Remote Sensing Principles were
adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly. 36 The provisions
in the Principles reinforce ideals laid out in the Outer Space Treaty,
such as the open and cooperative use of outer space (Principles II, IV,
V, VIII, and XIII).37 But more importantly, the Principles extend the
uses and benefits of remote sensing to include environment
monitoring (Principles I and X) and protection from natural disasters
(Principle XI), and establish basic guidelines for the access and
distribution of remote sensing data.38 For instance, Principle XI
provides that states "that have identified processed data and
analysed information in their possession that may be useful to States
affected by natural disasters, or likely to be affected by impending
natural disasters, shall transmit such data and information to States
concerned as promptly as possible." 39 Principle XII goes further,
stipulating that a sensed state shall have immediate access to data
and information concerning its territory on a "non-discriminatory
basis and on reasonable cost terms." 40 Lastly, Principle XIV recalls
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, making states the responsible
parties for national remote sensing activities, regardless of whether
these activities are carried out by state or non-state entities or
through international organizations.41
Unlike the Outer Space Treaty, the Principles are regarded as a
soft law instrument, which provide non-binding standards and,

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 4-10.
See generally Remote Sensing Principles, supranote 29.
Id. art. II, IV,V, VIII, XIII.
Id. art. I, X, XI.
Id. art. XI.
Id. art. XII.
Id. art. XIV; Outer Space Treaty, supranote 4, art. VI.

IMAGERY AND EXPECTATIONS

2015]

therefore,

do

not

impose

legal

obligations,

995

restrictions,

or

reparations. 42 What is more, the provisions within allow states a
great deal of freedom in the reading. Any prescribed obligations to
provide data can easily be dismissed when considering the qualifiers
of terms like "as promptly as possible" and "on reasonable cost
terms." 43 However, the universal acceptance and wide adoption of the
Principles by states, both in practice and within domestic laws and
policies and transnational agreements over time, has generated some
accord among scholars that the Principles represent customary
international law-or "general State practice"-as a result of
perceived levels of legal obligation and appropriateness (i.e., opinio
juris).44 An analysis of the extent to which the Principles should or
can be considered customary international law is beyond the scope of
this paper, but their normative influence as a soft law instrument is
important, as it has fed directly into the behaviors of remote sensing
states and the establishment and ongoing efforts of the Charter. The
next Part, then, begins with an operational overview of the Charter,
and is followed by a discussion on the political and legal dynamics
within Charter member states.

IV. THE CHARTER

The Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) was held in Vienna,
Austria in July 1999. A select issue at the event was the role of space
applications in different phases of the disaster management cycle." A
background paper prepared by experts from various national and
regional space and civil protection agencies, the WMO, and the
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction Secretariat
(IDNDR) highlighted a number of transitional programs and
proposals emerging to address the growing need for global, satellite-

42.
Steven Freeland, For Better or For Worse? The Use of 'Soft Law' Within the
InternationalLegal Regulation of Outer Space, 36 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 415 ( 2011).
43.
Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 29, art. XII.
44.
See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶1; North
Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep., 3
(Feb. 20); Joanne Gabrynowicz, The UN Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the
Earth from Outer Space and Soft Law, in SoFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF
NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 183, 186-89 (Irmgard Marboe ed.,

2012) [hereinafter Gabrynowicz, UN Principles];Tronchetti, Legal Aspects, supra note
6, at 518-519; Atsuyo Ito, Issues in the Implementation of the InternationalCharter on
Space and Major Disasters, 21 SPACE POLICY 141, 143 (2005).
See generally Third U.N. Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses
45.
of Outer Space, Disaster Prediction, Warning and Mitigation, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.184/BP/2 (May 25, 1998).
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derived, disaster aid. 4 6 However, they also concluded that, at that

time, there was still an absence of international mechanisms for
cooperation and dialogue between the space and disaster
management communities. 47 As a result, an InternationalCharter on
Space and Major Disasters was established to support disaster
response efforts by the European, French, and Canadian space
agencies (ESA, CNES, and CSA), and was declared operational on
November 1, 2000.48 Soon thereafter, other agencies and space

system operators proceeded to follow suit. Today, parties to the
Charter include space agencies from the United States, Canada,
Russia, China, India, Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom, along with a number of other
governmental, non-governmental, and commercial contributors acting
as cooperating bodies. 4 9
The overall goal of the Charter is straightforward: upon request,
members should gather and provide relevant satellite-based
information for any state or community immediately affected by
disasters.50 Technical resources can include satellite communications,
meteorology, and positioning and timing data; however, until now,
the Charter has primarily been tasked for remote sensing data and
information. Contributions are voluntary and there is no exchange of
funds among the members. Technical, administrative, and
operational resources and activities are divided among the signatory
agencies which make up the Charter Board, with a Lead Agency
function rotating on a six-month basis.5 1 The gathering and
distribution of these resources is dependent on the location and needs
of a specific disaster event and the availability of satellites and
agencies' personnel. In this regard, the contributions by members are
fairly uneven. For example, Project Managers (PM) are tasked from
member agencies or contributing bodies on an ad hoc basis. Thus, a
high number of floods in Asia one year may translate into more
human resource commitments from Asian partner agencies.
Additionally, data from more advanced satellites is often the most
useful. Thus, in recent years, very-high resolution (VHR) 52 radar and
optical data from U.S. and German commercial satellites far exceeds

46.
47.

Id. at 19-21.
Id. at 22.

About the Charter, INT'L CHARTER SPACE & MAJOR DISASTERS (2015)
48.
[hereinafter About the Charter], https://www.disasterscharter.org/web/guest/about-thecharter [https://perma.cc/P3JX-VAN8] (archived Sept. 21, 2015).
Charter Text, supra note 2, art. II, IV.
49.
Id. art. III, V (setting out clear definitions for what constitutes a crisis and
50.
who may activate the Charter).
51.
Eur. Space Agency [ESA], International Charter Space & Major Disasters,
at 7 (2013), https://www.disasterscharter.org/documents/10180/66908/13thAnnual
Report [https://perma.cclL9UZ-ZG7A] (archived Sept. 21, 2015) [hereinafter ESA].
52.
VHR data typically has a spatial resolution around 1 meter.
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the contributions from other parties.5 3 These contributions are not
insignificant: in 2013 alone, the United States provided 4,094
commercial VHR images to the Charter.54 But in spite of
distributional asymmetries, all members make annual contributions
that must be worked into their agency's or organization's budgets.5 5
Operationally, the Charter is widely regarded as a success
within the space and disaster management sectors.5 6 Its
achievements include steady numbers of yearly activations, a
continued increase in membership, automatic five-year renewals, and
a clear commitment to improving services over time.5 7 In addition to
its own activities, the Charter has also helped strengthen and bring
attention to other regional and international mechanisms using
satellite-derived information for disaster management, such as
Sentinel Asia, the EU Copernicus Programme, the Group on Earth
Observation (GEO), and the Committee on Earth Observation
Satellites (CEOS).
More impressive still is the Charter's political reach, both
internally and in the field. For instance, within hours of the 2008
Sichuan earthquake, the National Disaster Risk Reduction Centre of
China (NDRCC) activated the Charter.5 8 Among the many Charter
members who contributed data was the Japanese space agency
(JAXA), which provided high-resolution images (some of which are
still available on the Charter website), detailing damages to buildings
and infrastructure in many of the affected regions.59 From a
geopolitical perspective and more recent experiences, one does not
expect a lot of room for cooperation between these two Asian
powers. 6 0 But at that particular time, ongoing political tensions

53.
ESA, supra note 51, at 30-32.
Id. at 30.
54.
55.
See Joanne Gabrynowicz, Charter on Cooperation to Achieve the
Coordinate Use of Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or Technological Disasters
(Disasters Charter): Introduction, Initial Issues, and Experiences (Apr. 3, 2006), at 8,
[hereinafter Gabrynowicz, Charter], http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edulevents/pdfs/2006/
disasters-charter.pdf [http://perma.cc/RT26-KV2Z] (archived Sept. 21, 2015); see also
Joanne Gabrynowicz, Brown Bag: InternationalDisasters Charter:Introduction, Initial
Issues and Expereinces, WILSON CENTER (2012) https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/
brown-bag-international-disasters-charter-introduction-initial-issues-and-experiences.
56.
See, e.g., Brian R. Israel, Help from Above: The Role of InternationalLaw in
Facilitatingthe Use of Outer Space for Disaster Management, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF DISASTER RELIEF 217, 217 (Michael Kelly et al. eds., 2014); Ito, supra note 45,
at 145; Gabrynowicz, Charter, supranote 55, at 3.
See generally ESA, supranote 51.
57.
58.
Latest Activation: Earthquake in China, INT'L CHARTER SPACE & MAJOR
DISASTERS (May 11, 2008), https://www.disasterscharter.org/web/guest/-/earthquakein-ch-13 [https://perma.ccfY8Y6-SFES] (archived Sept. 21, 2015).
59.
Id.
60.
Owen Guo, China Says 'No' to Japan's Earthquake Aid Offer, GLOBAL
VOICES (April 24, 2013), https://globalvoices.org/2013/04/24/china-says-no-to-japansearthquake-aid-offer/ [https://perma.cc/9VLM-CGZX] (archived Sept. 21, 2015).
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seemed absent. A similar situation was observed following an
earthquake in Pakistan. 61 Initially, the UN entity that activated the
Charter instructed Charter members not to use acquired VHR data
for fear of stirring up diplomatic tensions. 62 The Pakistani
authorities, however, were seemingly unbothered by the political
implications and welcomed the Charter's assistance.63 Indeed, a quick
browse through the Charter website reveals that high-resolution
Indian satellites have been tasked at least twice more in recent years
to respond to floods in Pakistan.64 Of course, under international law,
no state has the legal authority to prevent another state from sensing
their territory. But the processing and sharing of potentially sensitive
data between political foes is a rather new phenomenon.
How, then, are we to view the Charter? The activities of its
members over the past decade appear to bypass conventional
domestic interests and geopolitical tensions, and, within an
institutional context, it continues to move forward as a successful
collaborative endeavor. To better understand these developments, the
final Part of this Article offers some reflections on the rational and
normative dynamics that may be guiding Charter member states.

V. DISCUSSION
As previously covered in this Article, the rational interests of
remote sensing states are many. Commercial and security concerns
continue to dominate among the policy objectives of satellite
operating nations. But it is less clear how these interests play out for
the Charter. Under international law and the mandate of the
Charter, the overall contributions of any member are state-sanctioned
activities. From a rationalist standpoint, these states should stand to
benefit economically and/or politically to some degree. Certainly,
there is value in investing in a global mechanism like the Charter, if
for no other reason than to share costs and resources for responding
to international disaster events. 65 And member states may
potentially benefit from further notions of reciprocity and legitimacy

61.
See Frans G. Von der Dunk, Legal Aspects of Using Space-Derived
Geospatial Information for Emergency Response, With Particular Reference to the
Charter on Space and Major Disasters, in GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR
EMERGENCY RESONSE 21, 27 (Sisi Zlatanova & Jonathan Li eds., 2008). Note the author
does specify which earthquake.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
64.
Latest Activation: Flood in Pakistan, INT'L CHARTER SPACE & MAJOR
DISASTERS (Aug. 22, 2013),
https://www.disasterscharter.org/web/guest/-/flood-inpakist-8 [https://perma.cc/Q9QL-G29N] (archived Sept. 21, 2015).
65.
See Israel, supranote 56, at 237.
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.

within the global aid community. However, the current domestic
policy trends make it difficult to identify such calculated and forwardlooking intentions.
In the commercial sense, cost recovery, annual sector growth,
and global competitiveness will always trump charitable objectives.
Satellites are expensive, and therefore, timely, high-resolution data is
not cheap. From the tasking of the satellite, to the acquisition,
processing, and translation of binary data sets into a single
multispectral image or map, the remote sensing processing chain can
easily reach into the tens of thousands of U.S. dollars. 66 Commercial
entities-public or private-have a difficult enough time covering
their own investments without giving away data for free. And where
data policies are concerned, states continue to implement tighter
control mechanisms for the distribution and use of these data. Indeed,
the notion of access on a "non-discriminatory basis" is increasingly
exploited and reworked to match strategic, national policy
objectives. 67 Ultimately, as remote sensing technologies advance and
the utility of data continues to grow, we can expect to see an increase
in these pricing regimes and policies that directly contradict with the
efforts of entities like the Charter.
Where does that leave us? On the one hand, the rational
concerns of states exist and should not be dismissed. On the other
hand, these interests appear to have very little to do with the
voluntary contributions of resources, time, and energy to the Charter.
As Peter Katzenstein writes, "in the absence of geostrategic or
economic stakes, why do some of the most powerful states . .
intervene to protect lives and welfares of citizens other than their
own."68 Indeed, for the Charter, a more complex paradigm has
evolved that looks almost altruistic in nature, and where normative
actors continuously work to shape expectations at the global level. To
frame the interplay among these actors, John Ruggie points to a
global public domain, where "discourse, contestation, and action [are]
organized around the production of global public goods." 69 This
domain, he observes, facilitates normative processes among state and
non-state actors in pursuit of broader social goals. 70 Over time, these
processes prescribe standards, expectations, and appropriate

66.
Buying Satellite Imagery: Pricing Information for High Resolution Satellite
Imagery, LANDINFO WORLDWIDE MAPPING LLC (2015), http://www.landinfo.com/
satellite-imagery-pricing.html [http://perma.cc/S3LL-KV9G] (archived Sept. 21, 2015).
67.
Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 29, art. XII; see GABRYNOWICZ,
supra note 8, at 11-14; 6, at 521-525.
68.
Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National
Security, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1, 1-2 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed.,
1996).
69.
Ruggie, supra note 5, at 519.
Id.
70.
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behaviors, which help shape and reconfigure the identities and
preferences of states. 71
When considering the origins and continued operations of the
Charter, it is nearly impossible to ignore active links to such an
arena. The global policy areas that have evolved around disaster aid
and cooperative efforts in space have, in many instances, been driven
by networks of non-traditional state actors. Alongside decision
makers, scientists, engineers, academics, and humanitarians have
championed their ideals and beliefs into guiding principles and rules,
which have helped to establish the prevailing norms in this field.
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink captured this process best,
writing, "As state bureaucracies and international organizations have
become more and more professionalized over the twentieth century,
we should expect to see policy increasingly reflecting the normative
biases of the professions that staff decision-making agencies." 72
For the Charter, its members stem from generations of experts
from the scientific and technical communities that have understood
the potential environmental and societal benefits that can be derived
from the open and cooperative use of space resources. In her own
research on the Charter, Joanne Gabrynowicz observed that the
Charter members "[c]onstitute a few small groups of dedicated,
motivated, specific, individual, lower-level government employees and
decision makers who believe in and are committed to the Charter and
its purposes."7 3 Early on, similar groups emerged in organizations
like NASA, the WMO, and the IDNDR, and worked alongside rational
actors to promote, institutionalize, and codify their values at domestic
and international levels. For instance, in spite of diverse national
interests represented within the U.S. Delegation during the drafting
of the Remote Sensing Principles, the acting parties collectively
endorsed the open collection and movement of data and information
across borders, as well as the position from developing countries
regarding provisions on early warnings and data sharing in cases of
natural disasters. 74 Individual motives and pragmatics aside, it was
evident that norms rooted in scientific exploration and environmental
monitoring had cascaded into an international legal forum, and
would, over the next decades, come full circle, making their way back
into domestic policies and practices.
Of course, social normative processes do not always translate
into legal norms, and the very notion of what constitutes a legal norm
is often contested among legal scholars.7 5 However, the codification of

71.
72.
73.
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Id. See generally Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 26.
Finnemore & Sikkink, supranote 26, at 905.
Gabrynowicz (2006), supra note 55, at 7-8.
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social norms-binding or not-at the international level is often
advantageous and a catalyst for a cascading effect among states.78
Soft law instruments are particularly useful here, as states are often
more willing to accept them. What is more, this Article asserts that
precisely because they are non-binding, these instruments may be
better conduits for advancing normative agendas, and equally as
effective as treaties at changing state behaviors.7 7 Not because they
prescribe obligations, but rather because they condition and constrain
78
decision making over time within a logic of appropriateness.
The Charter is an attractive case for exploring these arguments
due to the lofty and yet seemingly influential legal environment it
operates within. The ideals and expectations within the Remote
Sensing Principles have gradually shaped the behaviors of states in
this field both in policy and practice. Indeed, the commitments to
international cooperation, and continued contributions of remote
sensing resources by all Charter members appear to be directly
derived from provisions set out within Principles X and XI." This is
important; in an era of increasing national interests around space
activities, and where treaty making processes have hit a lull, the
Principles have helped shape global standards in the absence of
binding obligations.8 0 Furthermore, the "best endeavors" of the
Charter members have come to embody deeper normative values
within space law, which promote the use of space technology for the
benefits of humankind. 8 How or if this phenomena is applicable to
other global issue areas is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
implications alone warrant further exploration.
The efforts and global impact of the Charter over the past fifteen
years testify to commitments by the members that transcend rational
explanations. The territorial range of annual activations and political
constitution of the initiative can only be attributed to broader societal
influences. That is to say that, normatively, there is both a need and
expectation for such a mechanism. This argument does not propose
that the Charter does not suffer from the internal political processes
inherent to any international mechanism, nor does it assume that

76.
See Abbott & Sindal, supra note 22, at 42; Brunn6e & Troope, supra note
23, at 119, 129; Finnemore & 6, at 900.
77.
See generally Abbott & Sindal, supra note 22, at 42; Finnemore & Sikkink,

supra note 26, at 916; Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding
InternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 296-304 (1977).
78.
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 26, at 897-98.
79.
Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 29, art. X, XI; see also Gabrynowicz,
UN Principles,supra note 44, at 191.
80.
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level. FABIO TRONCHETTI, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPACE LAW AND POLICY 18-20 (2013).
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commercial interests are absent in the Charter's activities. For
instance, members have the option to charge for value-added
products, such as maps and other analyzed data. But the continued
increase in Charter members and activations indicates that a
normative shift has occurred. In the end, rational interests have
undoubtedly influenced the development of remote sensing activities
for disaster aid, but the experiences and expectations stemming from
the growing number of normative actors in this field have also
worked to reshape the identity and interests of spacefaring nations.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article set out to provide a possible explanation as to why
states actively and voluntarily cooperate and contribute remote
sensing resources for international disaster assistance. Through a
review of the actors, legal frameworks, and activities in the field over
the last half century, it showed that diverse political, economic, and
social interests have played a part in the evolution of the field and the
establishment of an International Charter on Space and Major
Disasters. Nevertheless, this Article argues that, over time, experts in
the scientific and technical communities have helped carve out a logic
of appropriateness around the use of space assets for scientific and
technical advancements, and for protecting the Earth's environment
and its human populations. Through social normative processes,
these shared beliefs and expectations have been codified in
international legal instruments, binding and not, which continue to
guide the efforts of the Charter and influence the remote sensing
industry as a whole.

